This paper outlines the ways in which the
INTRODUCTION
How can litigation concerning national security secrets be conducted fairly? All countries committed to the rule of law must wrestle with this question, to which there is no easy answer. States need to keep secrets. Not all activity with regard to national security needs to be kept secret, but some of it does. From time to time the operations and decisions of national security agencies will be challenged in court, whether directly or otherwise. How can such cases be managed fairly, with due regard for the fundamental principles of open justice and of natural justice, if much of the evidence relevant to the proceedings is required to be kept secret? These are not new questions, but in recent years they have come to prominence, not just in the * but in numerous countries around the world, including in the Commonwealth, in Europe, and in Israel. If the legislation can be shown to work effectively, it seems inevitable that it will be copied.
The measures contained in the Justice and Security Act are far from the only tools available to courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom to manage national security litigation. In order to understand both the controversy and the novelty of the Act it must be seen in the light of the UK's pre-existing rules in this area. There are three sets of such rules: first, the common law rules of public interest immunity (formerly known as Crown privilege); secondly, the statutory innovation of 'closed material procedure' and special advocates; and thirdly, the unique rules governing the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, a body whose procedures have generally been overlooked in the parliamentary and political battles over the Justice and Security Act. Each of these sets of rules will now be sketched briefly, before turning to the case law which gave rise to the Justice and Security Act, and to our examination of the Act itself.
PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY
The common law has long grappled with the tension that lies at the heart of the Justice and Security Act and has developed a sophisticated framework for handling disputes between the competing public interests of openness, on the one hand, and secrecy, on the other. This is the work performed by public interest immunity ('PII'), a common law doctrine of the law of evidence developed over a fifty-year period of case law. Under the law of PII, a public authority (normally either a Government minister or the police) may certify to the court that it would be contrary to the public interest for otherwise relevant evidence to be disclosed in legal proceedings.
The first modern authority is Duncan v Cammell Laird, a case decided at the height of the Second World War. 6 When a submarine flooded and sank in tests, killing 99 6 Duncan v Cammell Laird [1942] AC 624. servicemen on board, the next of kin of those who died sued the manufacturers, arguing that the vessel had been designed negligently. The Admiralty intervened, certifying that the submarine's plans and specifications could not be disclosed on grounds of (what we would now call) national security. 7 The House of Lords ruled that the courts had no jurisdiction to go behind such a ministerial certificate.
Material whose disclosure is formally certified by a minister to be injurious to the public interest may not be disclosed, their Lordships ruled. This ruling did not stop the action in negligence from proceeding. When that action later reached the House of Lords their Lordships ruled that no negligence could be proved. 8 The ruling that the courts could not go behind a ministerial certificate and determine for themselves whether material should be disclosed did not survive long. It was overruled as a matter of Scots law in 1956, 9 with English law following suit in Conway v Rimmer in 1968. 10 Conway v Rimmer, however, was hardly a matter of national security: it was an employment dispute between a probationary police officer and his former superintendent. None the less the House of Lords in Conway v Rimmer laid down the essentials as to how the courts should assess claims that evidence relevant to civil proceedings should be withheld from disclosure on public interest grounds. The correct approach, ruled their Lordships in Conway v Rimmer, is that the judge should inspect the evidence in question privately, and should decide whether on balance the harm to the public interest in its disclosure outweighs the harm to the public interest in its non-disclosure. The fair administration of justice ordinarily requires relevant material to be disclosed to all the parties -such is elementary to the principles of natural justice -and it is in the public interest (as well as in the interests of the parties) that this should occur. 7 'National security' is a phrase that gained currency in the UK only from the Cold War period. In the 1940s lawyers spoke instead about 'defence of the realm' and material whose disclosure would be 'injurious to the public interest ' When it does not, as, for example, when the material in question needs to remain secret, damage is done to the public interest. It is this damage which the judge is to weigh against the damage to the public interest that would be caused by the disclosure of material that ought to remain secret. This balancing exercise is often referred to as the 'Wiley balance', after the Wiley case which was decided in 1995 (see below), 11 there are certain classes of documents which ought not to be revealed whatever their content may be. Virtually everyone agrees that Cabinet minutes and the like ought not to be disclosed until such time as they are only of historical interest … To my mind the most important reason is that such disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is … It was only in 1980 that the balancing approach to PII was extended to Cabinet papers. 13 And it was only in 1996 that the Government announced it would no longer make 'class' claims to PII and that thenceforward its claims to PII would always be based on the damage to the public interest that could be caused by disclosure of the particular content of the documents in question. 14 The case law on PII was reviewed by the House of Lords in R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, ex parte Wiley. 15 As that case explains, the modern law is as follows. PII has a series of stages: first, it must be considered whether the material is relevant to legal proceedings (only relevant material is liable to be disclosed by one party to another in civil litigation). Secondly, the public authority must consider whether disclosure would entail a real risk of serious harm to an important public interest (such as national security). If, applying the 'real risk of serious harm' test, the material is assessed to attract PII, the third stage is for the public authority to decide whether, in its view, the public interest in non-disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. The public authority must consider and balance the relevant competing public interests; if the view is taken that the overall public interest favours non-disclosure, the public authority will make a certificate to that effect to the court. The court is the ultimate decisionmaker, its assessment being the final stage of the process. As part of its assessment the court will consider whether alternatives to full disclosure, whereby the risk of harm to the public interest might be lessened, 16 are available and, if so, whether they would be sufficient to meet the needs of justice.
All this is now well established as a matter of doctrine. What is much less well known is how widely PII is actually used in practice. When cases come to prominence it is usually because something has gone badly wrong with the PII 14 See Adam Tomkins, The Constitution after Scott (Oxford University Press 1998) 197-9.
15 Wiley (n 11). 16 Eg, disclosure subject to redactions or disclosure into a closed 'confidentiality ring'. There appears to be disagreement at the moment about whether disclosure may lawfully be made into a 'confidentiality ring'. In R (Serdar Mohammed) process. 17 The Government appears to maintain no central record of ministers' use of PII: we thus have no ready means of understanding whether its use is routine, occasional or exceptional. reported in 2010 that there were at that time a total of twenty-one different contexts in which special advocates may be used in the UK and that they had in fact been used in fourteen of these. 20 The core change made by the Justice and Security Act 2013 is to extend the availability of closed material procedure ('CMP') and special advocates generally to civil litigation in the UK. 18 Control orders were coercive (but non-criminal) measures imposed by the Secretary of State on an individual who was reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity. Control orders were seriously invasive of civil liberties and were highly controversial. They were replaced as from 2011 by Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). TPIMs are broadly similar to control orders, although there are some differences of detail. CMP operates as follows: the Government, advised by the Security and Secret Intelligence Services, 21 will divide its evidence and supporting material in a case into 'open' and 'closed' bundles. Material which the Government considers to be sensitive for reasons of national security is 'closed material'. 22 Open material will be served on the other parties as normal. Closed material will not be served on the other parties, but will be served only on a 'special advocate' and, where appropriate, shown also to the court. A special advocate is a lawyer with security clearance who is appointed from a list maintained by the Attorney General to act on behalf of a party in closed proceedings. 23 Once appointed the special advocate will have two main functions. The first is to test the Government's claim that the closed material really needs to be closed: thus, special advocates will seek to have as much of the closed material as possible disclosed as open evidence. The second function is to do what they can to protect the interests of the party on whose behalf they act. Where a court or tribunal hears a case partly under a closed material procedure it will deliver both an 'open judgment' and a 'closed judgment'. The latter will be disclosed only to the Government and to the special advocate. Neither the non-government party (or parties) nor the public have access to closed judgments. Indeed, we do not even know how many such judgments there are.
CLOSED MATERIAL PROCEDURE AND SPECIAL ADVOCATES
The exercise of the special advocates' functions is extremely difficult in practice. Martin Chamberlain, an experienced special advocate, published an 21 Namely, the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). See, respectively, the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. 22 Under the Justice and Security Act 2013 closed material is that whose disclosure 'would be damaging to the interests of national security', Justice and Security Act 2013, s6(11). In control orders or TPIMs cases, by contrast, closed material is that whose disclosure 'would be contrary to the public interest' (eg, TPIMs Act 2011, Sch 4, para 4(c)). National security is only one of several public interests that may be cited as justification of closed material in control orders and TPIMs cases: others include international relations and the prevention and detection of crime. Thus, the definition of closed material is narrower under the Justice and Security Act than it is under the control orders and TPIMs legislation. 23 At the time of writing there are 54 special advocates on the list.
-9 -instructive analysis of the issues in the Civil Justice Quarterly in 2009. 24 He identified three problems which particularly hamper the ability of special advocates to perform their functions effectively. His arguments were supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which took evidence in 2010 from three further special advocates. 25 The problems are as follows. First, even though the relevant procedural rules now allow it, special advocates have no ability in practice to adduce evidence to rebut allegations made in the closed material. Secondly, special advocates struggle to find ways of mounting effective challenges to government objections to disclosure of material. From time to time a web-search may reveal that some closed material is already in the public domain but, other than through making such a discovery, it is difficult for special advocates to find ways in which a court will be persuaded that material which the Government says must remain closed should properly be disclosed. Thirdly, special advocates are hampered by the rules which severely restrict communications between the special advocate and the party they 'represent' once the closed material has been served.
Despite these deficiencies in its operation, the system has been held by the courts to be capable of satisfying the requirements of the right to a fair trial under There are two key differences between PII and CMP. The first is that under closed material procedure as it operates in SIAC and control orders / TPIMs proceedings there is no balancing exercise -that is to say, neither the Government nor the court weighs the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-disclosure. Rather, the Government decides what evidence should remain closed and serves that material only on the special advocate. Once evidence is classed as being sensitive, there is no weighing of the reasons why it should be withheld against the reasons why, in the interests of justice, it should be disclosed: it is automatically withheld. It will remain closed subject only to the special advocate's ability to persuade the court otherwise. In contrast, the rule in the law of PII is that, as Lord Templeman expressed it in Wiley, 'a claim to public interest immunity can only be justified if the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the document outweighs the public interest in securing justice'. 30 This rule does not apply to closed material.
The second difference is that material which is subject to PII is inadmissible.
No-one may rely on it, including the court. Closed material, by contrast, is admissible and may be relied on not only by the Government but also by the court (who will deal with issues arising on the closed material in a closed judgment).
It is worth noting why we have closed material procedure and special advocates in the UK. These devices were introduced in Britain in the context of it described the Canadian position as 'a more effective form' of control, 34 and the hint was taken in the United Kingdom that were the advisory panel to be replaced with a quasi-judicial oversight regime such as that found in Canada, this was likely to be a Convention-compatible solution. Hence the creation in the UK of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, with its use of closed material procedure and special advocates: we have these devices in the UK because they were suggested by the European Court of Human Rights; and they were suggested to that Court by a number of human rights NGOs who had intervened in Chahal. 35
SECRET JUSTICE AND THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS TRIBUNAL
There is one last procedure to examine before we turn to the Justice and Security As regards disclosure of information, the IPT's Rules 36 provide in Rule 6 that:
The Tribunal shall carry out their functions in such a way as to secure that information is not disclosed to an extent, or in a manner, that is contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, the economic well-being of the United Kingdom or the continued discharge of the functions of any of the intelligence services.
Under Rule 6(2), the Tribunal may not generally disclose to the complainant or to any other person either (a) the fact that the Tribunal has held, or proposes to hold, an oral hearing; or (b) any information or document disclosed or provided to the Tribunal in the course of that hearing, or the identity of any witness at that hearing (exceptions are made in the event that the person concerned consents to the Tribunal disclosing the matter to the complainant). Rule 9(2) provides that: 'The Tribunal shall be under no duty to hold oral hearings, but they may do so in accordance with this rule (and not otherwise).' Under this Rule, if an oral hearing is held, the Tribunal may hear each party to the proceedings separately. In other words, the complainant may be wholly excluded from hearing any part of the Government's case. Finally, Rule 9(6) provides that 'The Tribunal's proceedings, including any oral hearings, shall be conducted in private '. 37 This is a model, therefore, not merely of closed evidence, but which enables altogether secret justice. It is designed to safeguard as paramount the consideration that the Government will neither confirm nor deny whether interception of communications or intrusive surveillance has taken place.
In Kennedy v United Kingdom 38 the applicant complained to the IPT that his communications were being improperly intercepted. 39 In Strasbourg, much of the 36 In accordance with statute (ibid s 69), the rules are made by the Secretary of State: see SI 2000/2665. 37 As an exception to this, hearings that are purely on points of law may be conducted in public. Rulings that are purely on points of law may likewise be public. taken place'. 41 Likewise the limitations on oral and public hearings. The obligation to hold a hearing is not absolute, ruled the Court: the circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral hearing come down to the nature of the issues to be decided.
The Court noted that Rule 9(2) permits the IPT to hold an oral hearing where it considered that such a hearing would assist. 42 For these reasons, the Court ruled that the restrictions on the procedure before the IPT did not violate Mr Kennedy's right to a fair trial.
Throughout its reasoning on the Article 6 issue the Court placed considerable weight on the fact that the IPT has the jurisdiction to hear any complaint made to it about unlawful interception or surveillance. There are no standing requirements and there is no threshold burden of proof that the complainant must satisfy before the IPT will investigate a complaint. The Court was also conscious, of course, of the fact that the case before it arose out of a complaint as to unlawful surveillance. In this particular context, it is perhaps understandable that the Court should accept the paramountcy of the 'neither confirm nor deny' principle. Secret surveillance would lose much of its potency if the state had to confirm whether or not it has taken place.
However, the jurisdiction of the IPT is not limited to complaints relating to interception and surveillance. It has the jurisdiction to hear any human rights claim brought against a member of the Security and Secret Intelligence Service (RIPA section 65). Moreover, this is an exclusive jurisdiction: RIPA section 65 provides that the IPT is the 'only appropriate forum' to hear such cases. the IPT had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the complaint, and the UK Supreme Court ruled unanimously that this contention was correct in law. 43 In a separate case in 2010 it emerged that an undercover police officer, while collating intelligence on a group of political activists, had entered into sexual relations with a number of the women in the group. The women sued the police, alleging that they were deceived into entering into intimate sexual relations. The claimants pleaded that a number of their Convention rights had been violated by this action, and also sued in common law tort for deceit, misfeasance in public office, assault and negligence. As a preliminary matter it was contended that RIPA section 65 conferred on the IPT exclusive jurisdiction to hear the complaints in the action that were based on Convention rights. The court ruled that the IPT does have such jurisdiction. 44 By contrast, it does not have jurisdiction to hear the common law claims in the law of tort. Clearly this is a procedural nightmare, but the pressing question in our context is whether the extraordinary procedures used by the IPT are apt for determining claims such as those in either of the two cases outlined here. Those procedures are designed to safeguard the paramountcy of the 'neither confirm nor deny' principle in the context of claims that surveillance has been undertaken unlawfully. However, there is surely no reason that this principle should be paramount in the context of a dispute about whether a former spy's memoirs have been excessively censored or, indeed, in a case where the issue is the lawfulness of entering into sexual relations under false pretences. It seems highly unlikely that Kennedy v UK will remain the last word on these matters for long. 45 45 Several complaints have been made to the IPT (including by Liberty) in the light of the disclosures in 2013 emanating from Edward Snowden that GCHQ and the US National Security Agency have engaged in much more widespread surveillance than was previously thought. Similar applications have also been lodged at the European Court of Human Rights, on which see the documents available here:
TOWARDS THE JUSTICE AND SECURITY BILL -THE AL RAWI CASE
https://www.privacynotprism.org.uk/news/2013/10/03/gchq-to-face-european-court-over-masssurveillance/.
These, then, are the UK's three current ways of managing civil litigation concerning sensitive national security material: the common law of PII, the statutory innovation of CMP, and the extraordinary procedures of the IPT. With these in mind we can move now to the reasons why the Government in 2011-13 considered that further legislation in this area was necessary. The key is the Al Rawi case, 46 a damages action in the law of tort. The case was brought by six claimants who had been detained (inter alia) at Guantanamo Bay. They sought damages in the English courts from the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Attorney General, the 47 The primary reason given for this conclusion was that by acceding to the Government's argument, 'while purportedly developing the common law' the court 'would in fact be undermining one of its most fundamental principles'. 48 Lord Neuberger explained as follows: 49 Under the common law, a trial is conducted on the basis that each party and his lawyer sees and hears all the evidence and all the argument seen and heard by the court. This principle is an aspect of the cardinal requirement that the trial process must be fair, and must be seen to be fair; it is inherent in one of the two fundamental rules of natural justice, the right to be heard… Further, continued the Court of Appeal, 'another fundamental principle of our law' is that the judge must make the reasons for his decision public. As Lord Phillips MR expressed it in a case in 2002, 'justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost'. 50 Additionally, Lord Neuberger said that, 'a further fundamental common law 47 First, a civil claim should be conducted on the basis that a party is entitled to know … the essentials of its opponent's case in advance, so that the trial can be fairly conducted … Secondly, a party in civil litigation should be informed of the relevant documents in the control of his opponent, through the [process of] disclosure … The Court of Appeal acknowledged that these various principles and rules are subject to exceptions. Public interest immunity is, of course, a common law exception to the ordinary rules of disclosure. But, as was pointed out above, a critical difference between PII and closed material procedure is that the effect of a successful claim to PII is that the evidence in question is excluded entirely from the litigation: no party may rely on it, and neither may the court. Under CMP, by contrast, closed material remains part of the litigation, but the Government shares it only with the judge and with the special advocate: the other party or parties to the case may not see it and, other than through the special advocate, may not challenge it. While the common law will admit of some exceptions to the fundamental principles set out above, the Court of Appeal ruled in Al Rawi that to adopt a CMP in a civil action for damages was not so much an exception to principle as an emasculation of it. As Lord Neuberger put it: 54 The principle that a litigant should be able to see and hear all the principles. 59 Later in his judgment Lord Dyson stated that 'a closed procedure is the very antithesis' of PII and that they are 'fundamentally different from each other'. 60 Whilst he acknowledged that the use of special advocates in CMP 'mitigates' the problems 'to some extent', Lord Dyson noted that they have their limitations: 'in many cases', he said, 'the special advocate will be hampered by not being able to take instructions'. Further, the judge hearing the case will not always be able to decide whether the special advocate has been hampered in this way. 61 Lord Dyson's conclusion was that the Government had not shown that it was necessary for the court to be able to order that a trial proceed under CMP and that, absent such clear necessity and absent legislative authority, it was a step that the courts should decline to take. Lords Hope and Kerr gave short supporting judgments, Lord Kerr adding the following remarks: 62 [The Government's argument] proceeds on the premise that placing before a judge all relevant material is, in every instance, preferable to having to withhold potentially pivotal evidence. This proposition is deceptively independent arbiter having access to all the evidence germane to the dispute between the parties. The central fallacy of the argument, however, lies in the unspoken assumption that, because the judge sees everything, he is bound to be in a better position to reach a fair result. That assumption is misplaced. To be truly valuable, evidence must be capable of withstanding challenge. I go further. Evidence which has been insulated from challenge may positively mislead. Now we come to the second position: that adopted by Lord Clarke and, with one modification, Lord Mance (with whom Lady Hale agreed). In order to understand the position of these Justices it must be recalled that the substantive dispute in Al Rawi had been settled by the time of the Supreme Court's judgmentthere was therefore no prospect of this case actually being litigated, whether under a closed material procedure or not. The terms of the Court of Appeal's decision in the case must also be borne in mind. The Court of Appeal had ruled that it could never be appropriate for a court to order that a civil trial be conducted under a closed material procedure, at least not without the consent of the parties. 63 Such a break with common law tradition could be authorised only by Act of Parliament.
Lord Clarke disagreed that it could never be right for the courts to do this: he saw circumstances where it might be appropriate. These circumstances are important, not least because they went on to form a core part of the Government's justification for introducing the Justice and Security Bill.
In Al Rawi six former inmates at Guantanamo Bay were suing five different departments and agencies of the United Kingdom Government on a variety of common law and human rights grounds for complicity in their detention, rendition and mistreatment. Under the ordinary rules of disclosure the Government must disclose to the claimants all relevant documents and other material in its possession. Clearly, a vast amount of this material will attract PII: there will be a great deal in the material that speaks directly, for example, to the ways in which the 63 Cameron was keen to settle the litigation). 64 Lord Clarke was more interested in another problem. What if so much of the material that the Government would need to produce in order to defend itself was subject to PII that the Government could not effectively defend itself at all? The result of a successful PII certificate, it should be recalled, is that the evidence covered by the certificate cannot be produced or relied on by any party to legal proceedings. The Government might be wholly innocent of complicity in wrongdoing but, at the same time, might be unable to prove its innocence, given the sensitivity of the material in question. What then?
As the law stands, the Government would have only two options: it could either concede the claim and settle the litigation; or it could apply to the court for the case to be struck out as untriable. Lord Clarke suggested that, if such a case arose, the court ought to be able to fashion a third option: namely, that the trial proceed according to some form of closed material procedure. Lord Mance agreed, although for him a judge should be permitted to attempt to fashion such a third option only after the whole of the PII process in the case had been exhausted, and 64 In Al Rawi itself, the Government claimed that it had 250,000 relevant documents in its possession and that PII may have to be claimed for as many as 140,000 of these. It was estimated that the PII process in the case would take upwards of three years to complete: see Al Rawi [2011(n 47), [135] (Lord Clarke).
only with the consent of the parties. 65 For Lord Clarke, the judge should be permitted to act in this way as soon as it became clear to him that the case would be untriable using PII -in some cases this may become apparent before the PII process has been fully completed. 66 For both Lord Clarke and Lord Mance, a court should be able to order that a civil action proceed under a CMP only if it was strictly necessary to do so. The test for necessity is that the trial could not proceed in any other way and that the only alternative to the trial proceeding under a CMP is that it would have to be struck out entirely. 67 At this point, we must ask, does such a case exist? Is there such a thing as a civil action that cannot be tried under the law of PII? We will never know whether the substantive action in Al Rawi could have been heard using PII, because it was settled out of court before the PII process had been completed. Remarkably, perhaps, the law reports appear to contain only one case which has been struck out on this ground, and even that case was almost certainly wrongly decided. The case is 67 Lord Mance said in Tariq (n 29) [40] that neither possibility -ie, having to settle an unmeritorious claim, or having a claim struck out as untriable -was one which the law 'should readily contemplate'. In the same case Lord Brown went further. He said that the submission that the Government never has to disclose sensitive material because it 'can simply pay up I find not merely unpersuasive but wholly preposterous' [ 84] . [I]f a fair trial of the issues in the case would necessarily involve the disclosure by the authorities of information or material which is sensitive or confidential and the disclosure of which is not in the public interest, and if that in turn means that it would be contrary to the public interest that the trial should take place, then the case should not be allowed to proceed … In the instant case it is in my judgment inevitable on the face of the statement of claim that a fair trial of the issues there raised will necessarily involve the disclosure of information and material by the police, the disclosure of which is not in the public interest.
Waller LJ dissented on the ground that the issue of whether there was a legally binding contract between the parties should be tried as a preliminary matter.
The great problem with Carnduff v Rock is that none of the leading case law in the Green Paper -which has now been enacted in the Justice and Security Act 2013 -was that CMP should be made generally available in civil proceedings.
The Government explained its reasons for making this proposal in the following terms. Its justification was that, in contrast to PII, closed material procedure maximises the amount of sensitive material that can be considered by a court, while, at the same time, protecting it from harmful disclosure. The Government argued that 'it is fairer in terms of outcome to seek to include relevant material rather than to exclude it from consideration altogether' (as occurs when PII is used) and that 'the public interest is best served by enabling as many such cases as possible to be determined by the courts'. 76 None the less, acknowledging that the use of CMP requires a departure from the principle of open justice, the Green Paper accepted that it should be available only exceptionally -that is, where it is 'absolutely necessary to enable the case to proceed '. 77 Moving to the detail, the Green Paper proposed that CMP would operate in civil cases in the following way. First, the Secretary of State would decide if a case involved certain 'sensitive material' whose disclosure could damage the public interest. Secondly, the Secretary of State's decision that a case involved such sensitive material would be amenable to judicial review. Thirdly, if the Secretary of State's decision is upheld, the case -or the relevant parts of the case -would be tried under a closed material procedure using a special advocate. 78 material', in the Green Paper, was given a broad definition: it was to include any material or information which if publicly disclosed would be likely to result in harm to the public interest. All secret intelligence would necessarily be 'sensitive' for this purpose and other categories of material might also fall within the definition, such as diplomatic correspondence. 79 The Green Paper also floated the idea that CMP be made available in certain inquests; it proposed modest reforms to the training and resources available to special advocates; and it floated the idea that the AF (No 3) 'gisting' requirement be enshrined (and limited) in statute. 80 But it expressly rejected the idea, suggested by Lord Brown in Al Rawi, that any solution lay in extending the jurisdiction of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal or in creating a new tribunal modelled on the IPT's procedures. 81 The Justice and Security Green Paper triggered a public consultation exercise which attracted 84 published responses and a further six which remained unpublished, but which are summarised on the Government's webpages. 82 The Government published a useful summary of the consultation responses. 83 In addition, Parliament's Joint Committee on Human Rights ('JCHR') took evidence and published a report on the Green Paper. 84 The majority of the responses to the consultation exercise raised four main sets of concerns about the Green Paper's proposals as to CMP: that they had not been shown to be necessary; that their scope was drawn too widely; that it should be for the court and not for the Secretary of State to trigger a CMP in any particular case; and that even with the use of special advocates CMP remained fundamentally unfair. In a notable development, 57 special advocates put their names to a collective submission in which aspects of the Green Paper were subjected to powerful criticism. The special advocates wrote that 'CMPs are inherently unfair; they do not work effectively, nor do they deliver real procedural fairness'. 85 They argued that the proposal in the Green Paper to extend CMP to civil actions was based on 'the unsound premise' that CMPs are fair and effective in the contexts in which they are already deployed. 86 Citing with approval Lord Kerr's dictum from Al Rawi, 87 the special advocates noted that the Green Paper failed even to acknowledge, never mind to answer, Lord Kerr's concerns. 88 Others, it should be pointed out, have suggested that the special advocates significantly underplayed their own effectiveness in their submission on the Green Paper. It is worth noting that the case files seen by Mr Anderson were selected by the Government; that only three of them were civil damages claims; and that at the material time Mr Anderson had not acted in any CMP cases. For these reasons the JCHR invited the Government to show the same material to a small group of experienced special advocates, but the Government declined to do so. 91 See JCHR 24th report (n 85) [73] . 92 ibid [122] . 93 For all the documents relating to the Bill, including its various printed versions, as well as amendment papers, select committee reports, Government responses to committee reports, and debates on the Bill, see http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/the-justice-and-securitybill and http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/justiceandsecurity.html. Not all of these amendments survived in the House of Commons. To take each in turn, the Government was initially unhappy about the move to allow any party to proceedings to apply to the court that the case should adopt a closed -32 -material procedure. The Government reasoned that only ministers could claim PII 94 and that it should therefore follow that only ministers ought to be able to decide when a case should adopt a closed material procedure. However, when it was pointed out to them that other parties may have legitimate reasons for wanting a case to be heard under a CMP, the Government dropped its objection to this amendment and it stands. 95 The Lords amendment that it should be for the court (and not for the Secretary of State) to decide whether a case should adopt a closed process was also accepted by the Government. It, too, may be found in the legislation as enacted. 96 The Lords amendment to insert into the process a Wiley balance was resisted by the Government, and did not survive in the Commons. However, during the course of the Bill's passage through the Commons an alternative to the Wiley balance was put in place. The Lords' Wiley amendment would have meant that the court could not declare that particular proceedings could adopt a CMP unless it considered that 'the degree of harm to the interests of national security if the material is disclosed would be likely to outweigh the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice'. 97 In place of this provision, the Commons moved that the court may declare that proceedings may adopt a CMP only if two conditions are met. The first is that a party to the proceedings would be required to disclose material that is sensitive for reasons of national security. The second conditionwhich is the important one for present purposes -is that the court must be satisfied that 'it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice' that such a declaration be made. 98 This provision -section 6(5) of the Act -is in many ways the lynchpin of the entire system of CMP as enacted, and we will return to it in a moment.
First, we must consider the fate of the last of the Lords amendments summarised above. Their Lordships passed an amendment which would have meant that a court could declare that proceedings may adopt a CMP only if the court considered that 'a fair determination of the proceedings is not possible by any other means'. 99 This 'last resort' amendment was also resisted by the Government and was removed from the Bill by the House of Commons.
Section 6(5) of the Act, however, may be seen not only as the Government's alternative to the Lords' Wiley amendment, but also as their answer to the Lords' 'last resort' amendment. Under section 6(5) no court will be able to declare that a case -or that part of a case -should be tried under a closed material procedure unless the court considers that it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice to do so. Given everything that was said in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court in Al Rawi about the fundamental importance of the principles of open justice and natural justice, and given the judicial acceptance in that case that special advocates are likely to be 'hampered' and may mitigate the problems inherent in the system of CMP only 'to some extent', 100 it is unlikely that courts will find the section 6(5) condition to be satisfied unless they are of the view that there really is no alternative in a particular case to ordering that CMP should be adopted. Section 6(5) is buttressed by section 7(2) of the Act. Under this provision, a court that has made a declaration that proceedings may adopt a CMP must keep the declaration under review and 'may at any time revoke it if it considers that the declaration is no longer in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice'. 99 Justice and Security Bill (n 98), clause 6(2)(d).
In other words, even though the Lords' 'last resort' amendment did not survive, the effect of the Act ought none the less to be that no trial will be permitted to adopt a CMP unless the court is satisfied that there are no alternative means by which the litigation can proceed. This was the view taken by the High Court in the first case to be decided under the Act. In CF and Mohamed v Foreign and Commonwealth Office 101 the claimants sought damages under the Human Rights Act and in the law of tort in respect of their treatment en route from Somalia (where they were arrested and detained) to the United Kingdom (where they were made subject to counter-terrorism measures). The court declared that, as regards one element of the trial, a CMP application under section 6(1) of the Act may be made. In so ruling the Court made it plain that in its view this was an action that, like Carnduff v Rock, would be otherwise untriable. 102 The court emphasised that that the interests of the claimants would be protected in the closed hearings not only by the special advocates, but also 'by the vigilance and care of the court itself'. 103 The courts have three means at their disposal to encourage them to interpret the legislation so that a CMP may be ordered only when it is clear that the action would be otherwise untriable. The first is the rule in Simms, sometimes known as the 'principle of legality'. 104 In Simms Lord Hoffmann said the following: 105 Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights … But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words … In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to 101 106 This decision, which was handed down one week before the Justice and Security Act came into force, marked the first occasion on which the UK's highest court examined a closed judgment of a lower court. The case concerned the lawfulness of a Financial Restrictions Order which the United Kingdom government had imposed on the activities within the UK of an Iranian bank. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled that the Order was disproportionate, that it had been unfairly applied and that it was for these reasons unlawful. 107 In seeking to resist this conclusion counsel for the Treasury had sought to persuade the Supreme Court to consider two matters that the judge at first instance had dealt with in his closed judgment in the case. 108 The Supreme Court ruled (by six-to-three) that they had the power to consider a closed judgment and (by five-to-four) that the power should be exercised in this instance. After looking at the closed judgment, however, they were unanimously of the view that there had in fact been no need for them to do so. 109 The judgment of the majority was delivered by Lord Neuberger, the President of the Court. He described Al Rawi as having established matters of 'fundamental' common law principle 110 and as having 'uncompromisingly' set its face against introducing a CMP. 111 He went on to say that 'any judge … must regard the prospect of a closed material procedure, whenever it is mooted and however understandable the reasons it is proposed, with distaste and concern'. 112 He concluded that an appellate court should be asked to conduct a closed hearing only if it is 'strictly necessary for fairly determining the appeal', that 'the initiation of a closed material procedure … should be avoided if at all possible', and that 'the court itself is under a duty to avoid a closed material procedure if that can be achieved '. 113 There is no doubt but that section 6 of the Justice and Security Act now permits that which was ruled impermissible by the appeal courts in Al Rawi. Closed material procedure may now be adopted in civil trials and in claims for judicial review. However, there should equally be no doubt that the use of CMP in any case heard under the Act will be effectively conditioned by the common law and Convention rights of the parties. The result ought to be that a CMP will be available in a civil trial only if that is the only means by which the litigation can proceed at all.
CONCLUSIONS
109 The court was sharply critical of the way in which the Government had sought to persuade it to look at the closed judgment, with Lord Hope stating that it was 'a misuse of the procedure' and that the experience 'should serve as a warning that the State will need to be much more forthcoming if an invitation to this court to look at closed material were to be repeated in the future' (Bank -37 -The Act as passed by Parliament is much improved on the original Bill and, even more so, on the proposals contained in the Green Paper. 114 One of the principal concerns expressed about the Green Paper was the scope of the proposal, as it then stood, to allow CMP to be used in civil litigation. The Act makes it clear (in contrast to the Green Paper) that the extension of CMP into civil litigation for which it provides is strictly limited to the national security context. It is also strictly limited to litigation: there is no provision in the Act enabling CMP to be used in an inquest Throughout its parliamentary passage the Justice and Security Bill was contested and controversial. National security litigation has gained unprecedented prominence in the United Kingdom in the last decade. This is true not only in the counter-terrorism field, where coercive measures which the state wishes to impose on suspected terrorists must be scrutinised in court, but also as regards litigation about the conduct of the UK's armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq 115 and as regards litigation concerning the extent to which the UK's security and secret intelligence agencies have been involved in US-led programmes of extraordinary rendition, illegal kidnapping, unlawful detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees. 116 A number of these matters have come into the public domain as a direct result of litigation. The fear of many of those who were most concerned about the Justice and Security legislation was that the law was being changed in order to make it more difficult for campaigners to use litigation in the United Kingdom as a means of exposing wrongs committed in the name of national security and as a means of holding office-holders to account for their actions. 117 The extension of closed material procedure, they reasoned, would allow the state to withhold a greater proportion of evidence and would lead to an increase in secrecy.
It would indeed be a travesty if this is the result of the Justice and Security Act. But, as we saw above, to increase secrecy has not been the Government's stated intention. Rather, the concern has been to increase the chances of national security litigation being fought to a conclusion, rather than being settled out of court or struck out as effectively untriable. It will be for the courts now to ensure that the Justice and Security Act achieves what the Government said it wanted to achieve. If the Act is used accordingly, and if its key provisions (notably section 6(5)) are interpreted in the manner argued for in this paper, then there is every chance that this legislation might well succeed in that next-to-impossible task of achieving both justice and security at one and the same time.
